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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
This master thesis is a study of how new investment models for gas infrastructure can 
contribute to realization of new gas resources on the NCS. It analyzes the separation 
of gas infrastructure from the rest of the field development and compares the result 
with the present investment model. The analysis also explores new potential investors 
that could invest in large gas infrastructure projects. 
The findings indicate that the IRR of the new model gives a higher rate of return on 
the field development by separating gas infrastructure from the rest of the field 
development. The results show a difference of 4,48% between the present and the 
new investment model, which indicate that a separation of gas infrastructure can lead 
to realization of more gas resources on the NC. The IRR is mentioned her since it is 
an important financial decision making tool in this thesis. 
The study explores the gas infrastructure history on the NCS and explains the 
corporate structure and the regulations of different companies, organisations and 
governmental bodies. 
The regulation of the gas transportation tariff is important for the analysis to be able 
to calculate the cash flow for the gas infrastructure investment. The IRR indicates that 
there are two potential investors of the gas infrastructure for the new investment 
model, which are Investment funds and the Norwegian government. Since the tariff is 
regulated to yield a reasonable rate of return of 7%, other potential investors indicate 
that the rate of return is too low to be profitable. E&P companies have to find large 
gas reservoirs to compensate for the regulated rate of return to meet their rate of 
return demands for investing. 
The analysis is based on modern financial decision making theories. Studies show that 
choosing the new investment model could relieve E&P companies form binding large 
amounts of capital in gas infrastructure; this gives them the opportunity to dedicate 
their capital to their core competence areas, exploration and production 
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DEFINITIONS  
1 GSm
3 
= 1 Billion Standard Cubic Meters, measures volume of gas  
BSGI Report – Barents Sea Gas Infrastructure Report 
E&P Companies– Exploration and production Companies 
EU – European Union 
Gassco AS – Operator of the gas pipeline system on the NCS, State owned company 
Gassled JV – A joint venture of companies that owns most of the pipeline 
infrastructure on the NCS 
HSE – Health, Safety & Environment 
IPO – Initial Public Offering 
IRR - Internal rate of return 
MPE – Ministry of Petroleum and energy 
NCS – Norwegian Continental shelf 
NPV - Net present value 
SDFI - The State’s direct financial interest 
TPA – Third Party Access  
WACC - Weighted average cost of capital 
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1.0 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 RESEARCH QUESTION 
Gas infrastructure consists of gas pipelines, processing terminals and receiving 
terminals for gas. This thesis assesses how the gas infrastructure on the NCS is 
financed today, and how possible new gas infrastructure could be financed in the 
future. The research will look at how new investment models can affect the project 
economy for a field when separating the gas infrastructure from the rest of the field 
development. 
1.2 MOTIVATION 
There are three basic motivators for this thesis. First, Gassco, the Norwegian gas 
infrastructure operator stated “The rate of return from field investments could be 
improved if separated from investments in the gas transportation system with 
regulated return.
1”  
Second, the increasing cost of production of oil and gas on the NCS has received 
attention in the industry and among international investors. This has increased focus 
on separating costs that are within the core business of the oil companies.  
Third, in 2013 the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy (MPE) adjusted the controlled 
tariff and increased focus on which entities could be interested in investing in 
separate, upcoming infrastructure investments and how these could be financed.   
These three challenges combined has been the motivation to write the thesis and 
answer the research question on how alternative financial models can affect the 
project economy and realization of new gas resources in the NCS.    
 
 
                                                 
1
 (Gassco AS, 2014) 
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1.3 METHOD 
The method used to answer the main research question is a combination of 
explanatory assessment and case testing. The thesis is divided into five parts to reach 
the conclusion. 
It will begin with a theoretical part to give an academic foundation on the research. 
Second, the thesis will focus on the background and organisation of the gas industry 
on the NCS. The third and fourth part of the thesis gives a more specific view on how 
infrastructure gets financed and who could be able to finance an infrastructure 
investment NCS.  
Last, the analysis will consist of a scenario analysis of two cases. The two cases will 
focus on the separation of gas infrastructure on the NCS and compare and 
interpret the findings. 
  
1.4 TOTAL E&P NORGE 
This thesis is written with guidance from Total E&P Norge. Their focus 
has been to provide the thesis with as much accurate information as 
possible, both thru their experience and knowledge from infrastructure 
investments on the NCS, and from their general knowledge of the 
industry.  
The French company Total S.A is the world’s fifth largest Oil and Gas Company and 
has its headquarters in Paris, France. There are approximately 97,000 employees 
working in Total S.A today, and they have operations in more than 130 countries, 
worldwide. 
2
 
Total E&P Norge is part of the Total S.A group and has revenues of around 50 BNOK 
a year. There are 322 employees in Total E&P Norge, which are engaged in the 
exploration and production of oil and gas on the NCS. They produce about 275,000 
                                                 
2
 (TOTAL SA) 
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barrels of oil equivalents every day, and are working to strengthen their position as an 
operator on the NCS.
3
 
DISCLAIMER: This Master thesis is written by the candidate alone and any and all 
interpretations, finding and opinions presented herein are those of the candidate, and 
does not reflect or intend to reflect the interpretations, opinions or intentions of Total 
E&P Norge AS. 
1.5 HISTORY OF THE GAS INFRASTRUCTURE IN NORWAY 
On the 23
rd
 of December 1969 Philips Petroleum found the first oil and gas field on 
the NCS
4
. The field was called Ekofisk, and soon became the largest offshore oil 
reservoir in the world. The newly discovered resources confirmed that there was oil 
and gas on the NCS. This lay the foundation for a new industry in Norway. In the 
years after the Ekofisk discovery more fields were discovered on the NCS and the gas 
production increased. This also increased the need for infrastructure to transport the 
hydrocarbons to shore and further to the European market. In 1977 the first offshore 
gas pipe line was built, Norpipe and later the same year the Frigg pipeline was ready 
for operation. The network has developed at the pace of the NCS and is now 
recognised as the largest and most advanced offshore gas infrastructure network.  
                                                 
3
 (TOTAL E&P Norge) 
4
 NPD.no (http://npd.no/no/Publikasjoner/Faktahefter/Fakta-2013/) 
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The gas pipe network consists of almost 8000km of offshore pipelines that transport 
gas from the gas-producing fields on the NCS to the UK and Europe. Approximately 
95% of the 109 GSm3 of the natural gas produced in Norway gets exported via the 
gas pipe network operated by Gassco AS every year
5
. The network is owned by 
Gassled JV and operated by Gassco AS. Gassled JV is a joint venture of investors, 
whereas Gassco AS is fully state owned company. The graph below shows a 
historical view of the gas sold form Norwegian fields over time. In addition, it shows 
some of the estimated gas sales until 2025. The level of gas sales is estimated to 
decrease from 2020. However, this may be stabilized if development of new gas fields  
keep growing. 
 
GRAPH 1, GAS SALES FROM NORWEGIAN FIELDS (MPE)6 
The net income the the Norwegian government has generated from the petroleum 
production is shown in graph 2. This gives a visual impression of how important the 
industry is for the Norwegian government. 
                                                 
5
 Gassco/Oljedirektoratet 
6
 (Norwegian Ministry of Petroleum and energy, 2013) 
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GRAPH 2, GOVERNMENTAL NET INCOME OVER TIME, IN BILL.NOK7  
To transport gas via the Norwegian gas infrastructure network the shipper has to pay a 
fee per sm
3
 of transported gas. The price changes according to which zone the shipper 
transport its gas.  
                                                 
7
 (Norwegian Ministry of Petroleum and energy, 2013) 
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The network is split into nine different zones, from A to I. Each zone represents a 
geographical area, a pipeline or a process plant that is linked to the network. The price 
setting in the different areas will be discussed later in chapter 3.4. 
 
FIGURE 1-1, AREA DISCRIPTION OF THE GAS NETWORK ON THE NCS8 
As seen in graph 1 and 2, the oil and gas sales has provided the Norwegian 
government with large economical resources for several decades. To maintain a high 
production level on the NCS of both oil and gas, new oil and gas fields  needs to be 
discovered and developed, which can contribute to the future economy of both E&P 
companies and the income for the Norwegian government. However, development of 
new fields comes at a great cost and, for some fields it is also necessary to build gas 
infrastructure. The development of such fields demands large investment with 
relatively high risk attached to it.  
To better understand the importance and difficulties of the investments in 
infrastructure on the NCS, as well as understanding the results of the analysis 
presented later on, the next chapter will go through general investment theory. 
                                                 
8
 (Gassco AS) 
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2.0 INVESTMENT THEORY 
To understand how investments decisions are made, this chapter will focus on the 
theory behind investments. First, theory behind real and financial assets will explain 
the difference between assets and their value for an economy. Thereafter, theory of 
financial markets explains the risks in the investments and the importance of portfolio 
diversification. Last, the different tools needed to invest and determine whether the 
investment meets the criteria set by the investors will be explained 
2.1 REAL- AND FINANCIAL ASSETS 
All economies consist of both real- and financial assets. Real assets are the 
cornerstones in every economy, and include land, buildings, machines, and 
knowledge that can be used to produce goods and services. Financial assets are stocks 
and bonds that contribute little value to the direct creation of goods and services. 
Financial assets are claims to the income of real assets, which can be bought through 
shares in companies or governmental bonds which includes the shareholder in 
governmental profit.  
According to (Levine, 2005) there are 5 different services that characterize a good 
financial system, these are needed to provide growth and financial stability, but there 
are large differences of how well these 5 functions are provided in different 
economies. 
- Production of information e.g. about possible investments and allocate capital. 
- Monitor investments and exert corporate governance after providing finance. 
- Facilitate the trading, diversification, and management of risk. 
- Mobilize and pool savings. 
- Ease the exchange of goods and services. 
18 
 
All these functions are needed to provide growth and financial stability in a economy, 
according to (Levine, 2005) the financial system in Norway provides these functions 
well, and is looked upon as an advanced economy by IMF.
9
 
The level of how well developed an economy is, often correlates with more structured 
and larger financial asset market, i.e. the United States. Large stock exchanges like 
NYSE, NASDAQ and Dow Jones, are good examples of facilitating trade for 
potential investors. Although financial assets do not directly contribute to the net 
income of the economy, large values are created for the economy in form of defining 
the allocation of income or wealth among investors. It makes it possible for people to 
invest in their future instead of consuming all their income as soon as they earn it. 
One of the main differences between the two assets is how the easy the assets are to 
trade in different markets. Financial assets can be small shares of a company that is 
traded on the stock exchange daily, whereas a real asset, like an area of land, is not as 
easy to find a proper buyer for.  
Commodities are easy assets to invest and sell compared to financing a railroad from 
New York to Los Angles. In the global financial market you can trade any kind of 
asset that is possible to put a price on. This includes both real and financial assets, and 
there are many differences between assets size, price, risk and rate of return.  
In the next section some of the differences between the assets in the financial market 
will be explained. 
2.2 FINANCIAL MARKETS  
Most economies have a financial market, and in the largest financial markets there are 
many possibilities to trade in several different sectors and products. The financial 
markets play a central role in the allocation of capital resource, and the most 
important ones are the stock, bond, currency and commodity markets. There are 
different shareholders in the market: You do not have to be an investor or trade in 
single stocks to participate in the financial market. It is possible to invest thru 
                                                 
9
 (Internatinal Monetary Fund, 2014) 
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different index funds. E.g. If you want to follow the infrastructure market you can 
invest in iShares Global Infrastructure
10
 (Bodie, Kane, & Marcus, 2011) that exposes 
their investors to companies that provide transportation, communication, water and 
electricity services.  
2.2.1 INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT 
For an investor or investment firm the main objective is to maximize the profit of the 
invested capital and minimize the risk. The assets with the highest risk are often the 
ones with the highest return, but also the assets that could generate the worst losses. 
An investor that wants a fast and high return on the invested capital would be 
interested in assets with high return and risk. An investor with a longer perspective on 
the investment would be wise to invest in less riskier assets, with a lower expected 
return.  
To maximize the profit and still maintain a good rate of return, investors could 
diversify their investments. By diversification an investor can buy both risky and less 
risky assets that combined could give a more stable, and higher return than a single 
asset over time. Diversification creates an opportunity for the investor to buy assets in 
different industrial sectors, which could avert downward cycles in some markets and 
minimize the loss.   
Infrastructure is an example of an asset that could help to diversify an investor’s 
portfolio. A general point of view of infrastructure is that it is a stable long term 
investment. There is a need for infrastructure in most countries and societies, and this 
is often regulated by the authorities. Infrastructure can have an income that correlates 
with the economy of the country and the general growth in GDP. This makes it a 
valuable and stable asset for a portfolio that consists of riskier assets. If the return on 
an asset correlates with the national economy, it is important to invest in a stable and 
political reliable country. One of the indicators of this can be how well developed the 
financial system is.  
 
                                                 
10
 (iShares by BlackRock) 
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2.3 INVESTMENT DECISION RULES 
This section will mainly focus on some financial models that are used for decision 
making in the analysis. The models that will be explained are cash flow model, Net 
Present Value model, internal rate of return, payback rule and the weighted average 
cost of capital. 
2.3.1 NET CASH FLOW 
Net cash flow describes the future income of an investment project divided into each 
year of the payback period (Berk & DeMarzo, 2011). The length of the payback 
period depends on the project. The reason to measure the net cash flow of the project 
is to find out if the investment is capable of a yearly return or a larger return over 
time, which is called the cumulative cash flow. The cumulative cash flow sums up the 
net cash flow for each year and calculates the total cash flow during the payback 
period.  In the analysis in chapter 6 both the cumulative and net cash flow will be 
used to analyze the investment models. If discounted cumulative cash flow is lower 
than zero, then the project does not satisfy the investors return on the investment. 
(Berk & DeMarzo, 2011) 
2.3.2 THE NET PRESENT VALUE AND THE NPV DECISION RULE  
The NPV is the total of the present values of all project net cash flows. It is explained 
by the following formula: 
     
  
      
     
Explanation of the NPV formula: (Berk & DeMarzo, 2011) 
t   = Number of time periods 
Ct = Net cash inflow during the period 
C0 = Initial investment 
r   = Discount rate 
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NPV decision rule: 
“When making an investment decision, take the alternative with the highest NPV. 
Choosing this alternative is equivalent to receiving its NPV in cash today.” (Berk & 
DeMarzo, 2011) 
2.3.3 IRR, INTERNAL RATE OF RETURN  
The internal rate of return, IRR, of an investment is the discount rate that sets the 
NPV of the projects cash flow equal to zero. This means that the NPV is negative for 
discount rates that are higher than the IRR, and the project shows no future increased 
value. (Berk, DeMarzo, 2011) 
2.3.4 WEIGHTED AVERAGE COST OF CAPITAL 
Weighted Average Cost of Capital is the effective after-tax cost of capital for the 
investor, the formula is shown under. (Berk & DeMarzo, 2011) 
       
 
   
   
 
   
         
Rwacc = WACC rate 
E = Value of investors Equity  
D = Value of investors Debt  
RE = Equity interest rate 
RD = Debt interest rate 
    Company tax 
The WACC is often used as discount rate for the NPV to value a project. 
2.3.5 PAYBACK RULE 
The payback rule is also used during investment decisions. As opposed to the NPV 
model, the payback rule is for single, standalone projects within a company. The main 
criteria are that an investment should have a profitable return within a specific period 
22 
 
of time, defined as the payback period. The payback period is normally set to a few 
years, depending on the investor. For profit in a project the investment has to be paid 
back during the payback period, if not, the project will be rejected. (Berk & DeMarzo, 
2011) 
A challenge with this model is that it might reject projects that have a positive return 
after the payback period is over. By using the payback rule, investors could reject 
projects and loose potential profit for the company.   
The payback rule does not take the cost of capital into consideration, which makes the 
foundation of the decision making less reliable comparing to the NPV method. The 
NPV takes the value of time and money to make it as reliable as possible into 
consideration. 
In the analysis the IRR, WACC and th NPV model will be used to calculate income 
and costs of an infrastructure investment. Due to the uncertainty of the payback rule 
this will not be used. 
 
3.0 BACKGROUND, GAS INFRASTRUCTURE ON THE NCS 
3.1 THE YEAR 2001 
The corporate structure of the pipeline network has not always been managed as 
today, namely with Gassco AS as a neutral operator of the network and Gassled JV as 
the direct owner of the network. This was initiated simultaneously as the IPO of 
Statoil ASA , in 2001. This, in addition to other factors, forced some changes to the 
organization of the gas infrastructure network on the NCS. 
When the first pipes on the NCS were built they were financed, built and operated by 
the upstream companies on the NCS. The large oil companies almost had a monopoly 
on gas sales and gas transport for a long period of time. They could in consultancy 
with other companies decide the prices for transportation of gas on the NCS. The 
council that took these decisions was called GFU, (Gassforsyningsutvalget) or Gas 
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Negotiation Committee. GFU was set by Statoil and Norsk Hydro (Saga Petroleum 
was also a previous participant in GFU) (Austvik, 2003).They could sell and manage 
the gas from the fields on the resource owners’ behalf because they owned and 
operated the system. The planning and development of the gas pipe network was 
managed by the Gas Supply Committee (FU, Forsyningsutvalget). They planned the 
development of the system along side with the upstream companies who developed 
the oil and gas fields. The reason for this organizational structure was to get the gas 
transport system as efficient as possible in the beginning. It was a sufficient way to 
manage a system that was still small and compact, with few pipelines to manage.  
The system developed into a much larger network from 1977 to 2001, not only with 
pipelines but processing plants as well. (See table 1 and 2.) 
In the 1990’s the EU decided to liberalize the gas market to prevent monopolies of 
having ownership in all parts of the gas infrastructure network in Europe. This was 
done according to the EU’s gas market directive for organization of transport 
operations.  
The EU proposed three directives to liberalize the market for gas transport.
 
(Austvik, 
2003) The essential paragraphs of these three directives are stated under. 
A. Make the market more transparent (EU, 1990) 
B. Allow the transit of gas between high pressure transmission pipelines (EU, 
1991) 
C. Introduce third party access (TPA) to the transmission pipelines as well as 
splitting the transmission companies’ function as both transporters and 
wholesalers (EU 1992) 
Both paragraph A and B above were approved shortly after they were proposed, 
whereas paragraph C was approved and implemented as late as August 2001. 
These directives were the main reason of the establishment of Gassled JV and Gassco 
AS. The Norwegian government had to organize the network for an independently 
24 
 
controlled transport system for the gas shipped from Norway to Europe. This was 
done by merging all the separate ownerships of the gas infrastructure into a network, 
Gassled, and presented each company with a share that represented their invested part 
of the gas infrastructure. 
The second measure the government executed in 2001 was the establishment of a 
state owned independent company, Gassco, whose purpose is to operate the gas 
network on behalf of the owners and the Norwegian government. As a result, the NCS 
had a third party that could control the operations of the gas transport, as a neutral 
operator of the system. The new structure made the market more transparent and less 
monopolized in line with the EU directives.  
The next two sections will describe more about the main actors involved in the gas 
transportation network on the NCS today: Gassled JV and Gassco AS. 
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3.2 GASSLED JV 
Gassled JV is a Joint venture company that owns most of the pipeline network on the 
NCS.  “Table 1” shows an overview over the pipelines that are merged into the 
Gassled system. 
Gas pipelines included in Gassled    
Pipeline Startup Product Start point End point 
Zeepipe     
Zeepipe 1 1993 Dry gas Sleipner riser platform  Zeebrugge 
Zeepipe 2A 1996 Dry gas Kollsnes  Sleipner riser platform 
Zeepipe 2B 1997 Dry gas Kollsnes  Draupner E 
     
Europipe 1 1995 Dry gas Draupner E  Dornum/Emden 
Franpipe 1998 Dry gas Draupner E  Dunkerque 
Europipe II 1999 Dry gas Kårstø  Dornum 
Norpipe AS 1977 Dry gas Norpipe Y (Ekofisk 
Area) 
Emden 
Åsgard Transport 2000 Rich gas Åsgard  Kårstø 
Statpipe     
Zone 1 1985 Rich gas Statfjord  Kårstø 
Zone 4A 1985 Dry gas Heimdal  Draupner S 
Zone 4B 1985 Dry gas Draupner S  Norpipe Y (Ekofisk 
Area) 
     
Oseberg Gas Transport 2000 Dry gas Oseberg  Heimdal 
Vesterled (Frigg transport) 2001 Dry gas Heimdal  St. Fergus 
Langeled North 2007 Dry gas Nyhamna Sleipner Riser 
Langeled South 2006 Dry gas Sleipner Easington 
Tampen Link 2007 Rich gas Statfjord  FLAGS 
Norne Gas Transportation 
System 
2001 Rich gas Norne field Åsgard Transport  
Kvitebjørn gas pipeline  2004 Rich gas Kvitebjørn Kollsnes 
Gjøa Gas Pipe  2010 Rich gas Gjøa Field FLAGS  
TABLE 1, PIPELINES INCLUDED IN GASLED JV11 
“Table 2” shows the terminal facilities that are included in the Gassled Network.  
                                                 
11
 (Staoil ASA) 
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After Gassled JV was established, most of the infrastructure was merged into Gassled 
JV. This was in line with the Third party access (TPA), proposed by the EU. The 
intention of the proposal was to prevent monopolies in the industry. The joint venture 
was created so that all of the former owners of infrastructure on the NCS, should now 
own their share in Gassled JV instead. The ownership structure in Gassled is shown in 
Table 3, with ownership figures from 2009-2010. 
Ownership Structure Gassled   2009-2010                 
Petoro AS  38,43 % 
Statoil ASA  32,07% 
Exxon Mobil  9,40% 
TOTAL E&P Norge  7,76% 
Shell  5,34% 
Norsea Gas AS  2,72% 
ConocoPhillips Skandinavia AS  1,99% 
Eni  1,52% 
DONG E&P Norge AS  0,66% 
GDF SUEZ E&P Norge AS  0,09% 
RWE Dea Norge AS   0,02% 
TABLE 3, OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE GASSLED JV13 
                                                 
12
 (Staoil ASA) 
13
 (Staoil ASA) 
Terminal facilities included in Gassled     
Terminal Startup Product Location 
Europipe Receiving Facilities 1995 Dry gas Dornum, Germany 
Europipe Metering Station 1995 Dry gas Emden, Germany 
Norsea Gas Terminal 1977 Dry gas Emden, Germany 
Kårstø Gas Processing Plant 1985 Dry gas/NGL Kårstø, Norway 
Easington Receiving Facilities 2006 Dry gas Easington, UK 
St.Fergus Terminal 1978 Dry gas St. Fergus, Scotland 
Kollsnes Gas Processing Plant  1996 Dry gas/NGL Kollsnes, Øygarden Norway 
TABLE 2, TERMINALS INCLUDED IN GASSLED JV12 
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The year after in 2011 the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy (MPE) allowed investors 
to buy upstream companies shares in Gassled JV. The result of this was a substantial 
change in the Gassled JV owner structure. Table 4 show the ownership structure of 
Gassled JV from the 5
th
 of November 2012. 
Ownership Structure Gassled                   
05.11.2012 
Petoro AS*  45,79 % 
Solvieig Gas Norway AS  24,76 % 
Njord Gas Infrasructure AS  8,04 % 
Silex Gas Norway AS  6,10 % 
Infragas Norge AS  5,01 % 
Statoil Petroleum AS  5,00 % 
Norsea Gas AS  2,26 % 
ConocoPhillips Skandinavia AS  1,68 % 
DONG E&P Norge AS  0,98 % 
GDF SUEZ E&P Norge AS  0,30 % 
RWE Dea Norge AS   0,08 % 
TABLE 4, OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE OF GASSLED JV14 
*Petoro increased their interest by approximately 7%, while all other parties reduced their interest 
proportionally.
15
 
3.3 GASSCO AS 
Gassco AS was established on the 14
th
 of May 2001, and started operating the 
Norwegian gas pipe network from 1
st
 of January 2002.  
Gassco AS is a governmental owned company that operates the Norwegian offshore 
gas pipe network. Their goal is to operate the network without profit, just cover their 
operating cost so that the transportation cost of gas is held to its minimum.  
The company divides its business into four main areas
16
: 
                                                 
14
 (Gassled JV) 
15
 (Staoil ASA) 
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1. Technical operator of the network 
 Gassco AS has the main responsibility of technical operations on 
behalf of the joint ventures that own the network. 
2. Infrastructure development 
 Gassco AS contributes to planning of future gas pipes and transport 
related facilities.   
3.  Capacity administration 
 Gassco AS allocates the capacity of the gas pipes and process plants 
4. System operations 
 Ensure that Norwegian gas get to the right place with the right volume 
and right quality. 
Gassco AS supports and facilitates the planning and development of new 
infrastructure network. The main planning, financing and development for fields are 
done by the E&P companies. Gassco AS is the operator of the gas infrastructure and 
administrates the transport and capacity for the shareholders. The MPE sets a tariff for 
transporting gas through the pipeline to ensure that the shareholders gets a reasonable 
rate of return on the capital invested. How the tariff is set is explained in the next 
section . 
3.4 TARIFF REGULATION ON THE NCS 
The tariff for gas transport on the NCS is regulated by the government. It is the MPE 
that sets the tariffs through separate regulations. This is done so the MPE can ensure 
that the profit on the NCS is taken from the production, and not from the transport 
system (Norwegian Ministry of Petroleum and energy, 2013).  
The tariff is based on this formula, set by the MPE. 
   
                                                                                                                                           
16
 (Gassco AS) 
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K represents the capital invested during the construction of the infrastructure.    
O represents the operational cost of the pipeline and small investments to the system.  
I represent the investments in the pipeline after the pipeline is built. 
U represents the investments to expand the pipeline system.  
The U element has never been used by Gassco AS. 
3.4.1 THE K ELEMENT, RETURN ON CAPITAL OF INVESTMENT 
After a pipeline has been built, the investors have a right to a reasonable return on 
their investment. This reasonable return has historically been set to 7%. The K 
element is calculated based on how much gas that is assumed to run though the 
pipeline in its lifetime. This implies that the higher the production estimates are in the 
field, the lower the K will be in the formula. Graph 3 and 4 below are examples to 
illustrate the calculation of the K value. 
 
GRAPH 3, ESTIMATED VOLUMES AT STARTUP, GIVEN IN MILLION SM3 (LEFT AXIS) 
 
GRAPH 4, PIPELINE CAPEX, IN MILLION NOK ( LEFT AXIS)  
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The two graphs show what the K element is based on:  
A. The K element price is given in NOK/Sm3 
  
B. The CAPEX (graph 4) is divided into how much gas that is estimated to run 
through the pipeline in its lifetime (graph 3).  
The CAPEX, plus the 7% in return is calculated as a cost per unit,  NOK/Sm
3
, to 
ensure that the investors get their return when the field has produced the estimated 
volume.
 
 
3.4.2 THE O ELEMENT, OPERATIONAL COST 
When production of gas and the operation of the pipeline starts, there is an additional 
operational cost for the pipeline. Also included in the O element are small 
investments that cover maintenance of the pipeline. There are restrictions on the size 
of these investments, and the following table (table 5) shows what restrictions there 
are on the O element each year. If the planned investment exceeds these limits, the 
investment is calculated as an I-element. When Gassco AS calculates investments in 
the O element, it is returned within the same year. These investments do not include a 
rate of return as the K element does. 
Area Upper limit of O the element 
A & B 40 m. NOK x E 
C 250 m. NOK x E 
D 200 m. NOK x E 
E 250 m. NOK x E 
F 40 m. NOK x E 
G 40 m. NOK x E 
H 40 m. NOK x E 
I 40 m. NOK x E 
TABLE 5, UPPER LIMITS OF THE O ELEMENT 
3.4.3 THE I ELEMENT, INVESTMENTS ON THE PIPELINE   
Table 5 shows the limits of investment in each area of the O element. If the amount 
gets higher than the limits above it is structured as an investment in the I element. 
These are investments paid back over several years, unlike the O element that pays 
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back the same year. The I element includes the 7% reasonable rate of return that is 
given in the K element. 
3.4.4 THE U ELEMENT, EXPANDING OF THE PIPELINE 
The U element of the formula is covering project costs for expansion of the pipeline. 
The U element has never been used as by Gassco AS. 
3.5 INFRASTRUCTURE ON THE NCS TODAY 
The tariff regulation ensures that the tariffs are held at a reasonable level and that no 
one has a higher profit than the regulated profit on infrastructure investments. 
It is assumed that E&P companies on the NCS have a rate of return goal of 
approximately 15% on their investments. The tariff regulation makes it challenging 
for them to reach their targets for rate of return.  
According to the “Regulations to the Petroleum Act §62” (Lovdata), investors of gas 
infrastructure are entitled to a priority to book capacity in new gas infrastructure 
projects. This means that if E&P companies want to secure transport of gas to the 
market, it is necessary to invest in pipelines under the current regulations. The 
companies that do not invest can book the remaining capacity if and when it is 
available. 
As explained earlier, investment funds have bought large shares in Gassled. This has 
freed capital to the E&P companies, which can be used to focus on exploration and 
production. This is positive for both investors, who look for a long-term investment, 
and for E&P companies who can free capital to focus production of oil and gas. 
To make it beneficial for the investors on the NCS there has to be a reasonable profit 
for the investor to cover for the risk they take. The politics on the NCS has been 
considered reliable until the tariff was adjusted in 2013. The governmental decision to 
change the tariff has made it riskier for investors that look for a stable income over 
time. A return on an investment of 7% is a good investment for some investment 
companies. These are often large investment funds or investors that depend on long-
term investments with stable income and low risk. For an E&P company with an 
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assumed rate of return of 15 %, the benefits of an investment in infrastructure at 7% 
would not generate any sufficient profit, but it would create a transportation 
opportunity from a future field development. And this is a valuable incentive for E&P 
companies.  
The next chapter will focus on investments in the infrastructure segment and point out 
the special factors when investing in infrastructure in general and on the NCS 
4.0 HOW INFRASTRUCTURE IS FINANCED 
This chapter consists of two elements. First the different investment approaches that 
can be suitable for investors within infrastructure will be assessed. Subsequently 
possible investors for infrastructure will be analysed.  
4.1 INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENTS 
Infrastructure is an extensive term which includes most of buildings, roads and 
networks needed for the functioning of a community or society. The physical 
specifications can be divided into two types, economical and social sectors. The first, 
the economical infrastructure, includes transport, utilities, communication and 
renewable energy. And the second, the social infrastructure, also called public real 
estate, includes schools, hospitals, defence buildings, prisons, and stadiums. (Della 
Croce, 2012) 
Economical infrastructure Social 
Infrastructure 
Transport Utilities Communication Renewable Energy Public Real Estate 
Toll Roads Water  
Supply 
Mobile Network Wind Schools 
Parking Garbage Disposal Satellites Solar Hospitals 
Airports Sewers Internet Wave Prisons 
Harbors Pipelines  water Military Bases 
Tunnels    Parks 
Bridges    Stadiums 
Railway     
TABLE 6, ECONOMICAL INFRASTRUCTURE 
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The variety of infrastructure assets lead to disagreement on what types of 
infrastructural assets should be included in the model above. According to (Inderst, 
2009) there are several characteristics that can identify an infrastructural asset, 
including several economic aspects that emphasize the limited competition of the 
marked, these are listed as followed.   
- Economic: Natural monopolies  
- Regulation: Controlled charges and fees. 
- Concession from authorities: Long-dating contracts 
Infrastructure assets typically show one or more of the following economic 
characteristics: 
- High barriers to enter the market 
- Economies of scale (e.g. high fixed,  low variable cost) 
- Inelastic demand for services (giving pricing power) 
- Low operating cost and high target operating margins 
- Long duration of the investment (25 to 99 years, etc.) 
These characteristics give a good perspective of how an infrastructural asset is 
described as an asset class. Next, the infrastructural investment will be described and 
divided into different investment assets.  
4.1.1 GREENFIELD VERSUS BROWNFIELD INVESTMENTS 
There is a difference between investing in a business plan for a new railroad and 
investing money in a fully functional railroad that have a profitable return. The 
outcome of the investment can be the same for both alternatives but there is more risk 
involved in investing in a business plan than in an investment that                                                           
gives a return. This is an example of the main difference between a Greenfield 
investment and a Brownfield investment, and in this section of the thesis these two 
terms will be explained more specifically.  
Greenfield projects are uncompleted projects, or projects that not have been started 
yet. They may be in the construction, financing or planning stage and still need large 
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investments to get completed. In these types of projects the risk of things going 
wrong, delays or unforeseen problems are high, and can be intimidating for some 
investors.  
Brownfield projects are finished, operating and already making a profit. This makes it 
safer to invest, since much of the risk already is eliminated in earlier processes.  
Investors in Brownfield projects will typically be looking for a safe investment, with 
as little risk as possible and a long time horizon with a sustainable rate of return.  
Investors looking for a greater profit in the long term often seek new projects that 
have the typical Greenfield project prerequisites. These investments often have a J-
curved graph to describe them. There are large investments in the beginning of the 
project when the income is generated after some years and the market has grown into 
a profitable market. This profit can often be substantially larger than the capital 
expenditure that was invested at the start of the project, hence generating a 
substantially high profit.  
To compare Greenfield and Brownfield projects with other asset classes, according to 
(Inderst, 2011) Greenfield and Brownfield infrastructure investments vary in relation 
to traditional asset classes; this is shown in Figure 2 below. The figure shows the 
correlation between expected risk and expected return among the different assets. 
Fixed income is at the bottom, with low risk and low return, while Brownfield 
projects have a medium risk and medium return. The two with the highest possible 
return are the Equities and the Greenfield projects. The figure below show a picture of 
the differences between assets class and where the Greenfield and Brownfield projects 
are located.   
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FIGURE 4-1, RISK RETURN PROFILES COMPARED WITH OTHER ASSET CLASSES17 
 
On the NCS, Greenfield and Brownfield projects are valued in a different way. Since 
there are strict HSE rules on the NCS, it can be risky and costly to do maintenance or 
upgrades while the field is still producing oil and gas. Brownfield projects are 
categorized as a “live patient” for stakeholders. The field sometimes has to stay in 
production while upgrading since the cost of shutting down production is high. The 
risk of investing in a producing Brownfield project, compared to a Greenfield project 
that has no production, can be high. 
As described above there are different elements of investment that attract different 
types of investors, often characterized by what kind of risk the investors are willing to 
take. In chapter 4.2 different types of investors will be described. First the pension 
funds that look at investing in Norway will be discussed, thereafter the Norwegian 
government infrastructure investment philosophy in Norway will be looked into. 
Lastly the possibility for private companies to invest in infrastructure is assessed. 
Later in the thesis these alternatives will be compared to find the most favourable 
alternative for future investment models on the NCS 
 
                                                 
17
 (Inderst, Papers.ssrn.com, 2011) 
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4.2 WHO HAS THE ABILITY TO INVEST IN INFRASTRUCTURE ON 
THE NCS 
There are three types of investors that could have the ability and strategy to invest in 
the typical infrastructure projects on the NCS. Since the present investment model 
involves the E&P companies, this is the first type.  The second type is the Norwegian 
government and the thesis will discuss how it would be willing and able to invest in 
infrastructure. The third type is the international pension funds.  
When discussing the alternative investors the focus will be on the difference between 
the incentives to invest and what type focus they have on risk and return of capital. 
4.2.1 FUNDING BY E&P COMPANIES 
E&P companies have financed the existing pipeline network on the NCS. They have 
had reasonable returns on the investments and managed to make a stable and 
functional transportation network. However, as mentioned earlier in the thesis, the 
economic situation for the E&P companies on the NCS has changed over the later 
years due to higher cost of extracting oil and gas. This makes it harder for E&P 
companies to invest in projects with a fixed return on 7%. Since cost related to 
infrastructure can be a large part of a total field development cost, the return of the 
field has to be substantial in order to make the investment profitable.     
The present investment model facilitates for the E&P companies to fund infrastructure 
on the NCS. Some of the large international companies that are active on the NCS 
would normally have easy access to capital through their parent company, whereas 
some of the minor companies do not necessarily have the same opportunities and have 
to obtain capital at a higher cost. How high their cost is will be explained more 
thorough in the analysis later in the thesis. The cost of investing is important, but for 
E&P companies there are other incentives to invest in infrastructure, as they need 
capacity in the pipelines to transport the produced gas to be able to sell it.   
4.2.2 GOVERNMENTAL FUNDING 
General infrastructure in Norway e.g. toll-roads, bridges or other infrastructure 
projects is financed by the Norwegian government. Governmental owned companies 
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are created to finance, build and maintain the infrastructure (PÖYRY, 2013).  Two 
examples of this is the Public Road Administration who covers the public roads in 
Norway and Statnett who owns maintains and administrates about 90%
18
 of the 
electrical grid network  
The governmental funding of infrastructure on the NCS is not as integrated, as it is 
onshore. Gas infrastructure is financed in combination with the field development and 
the infrastructure normally gets transferred into Gassled when it is operational. In 
order to finance gas infrastructure on the NCS the government could either integrate it 
in the national budget, or let the Governmental Pension fund invest in the gas 
infrastructure. 
The Governmental Pension fund has its own independent management and 
investment strategy. The fund is not directly controlled by the government, but it has 
strict guidelines set by the Norwegian Ministry of Finance. This indicates that the 
governmental pension fund will invest in projects that suit their portfolio in 
accordance with governmental guidelines. 
Both of the alternatives can finance the project with equity or loan, but the weighting 
of this can vary, and in some cases investment funds and pension funds or the 
National budget is able to finance the whole investment solely by the use of equity. 
4.2.3 LARGE INTERNATIONAL PENSION FUNDS 
According to the OECD Large International Pension Fund Survey (Della Croce, 
2012), there were 52 funds included in the survey that had a total of USD 7.7 trillion 
assets under management at the end of 2010. Of these assets the amount invested in 
infrastructure was 0.5% or USD 41.8 billion of the total assets in the survey. The 
numbers above show that there is a large potential for pension funds to invest in 
infrastructure in both national and international markets.  
The Australian Pension fund was the first to look at infrastructure as a possible asset 
back in the 1990´s. The Canadian pension fund was also early to invest in the sector, 
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 (Nowegian Ministry of Petroleum and Energy) 
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and both the Australian and Canadian Pension fund have a much higher percentage of 
their portfolio in infrastructure then the rest of the world.  
In later years international pension funds in Europe has seen the opportunities of 
investing in infrastructure and are slowly trying to get involved in the market. 
 
5.0 ALTERNATIVE INVESTORS 
  
 
FIGURE 5-1, ALTERNATIVE INVESTORS FOR THE INFRASTURCTURE ON THE NCS 
Figure 5-1 shows the financial separation of infrastructure on the NCS and how the 
alternative new investment model can appear. The figure shows the alternatives that 
are mentioned in chapter four, funding by E&P companies (Minor or Major), 
governmental funding and funding by investment funds. Whether these alternatives 
can contribute to realization of new gas resources on the NCS will be discussed in 
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chapter 5, the main analysis of the two investment models will be presented in chapter 
6. The focus of the analysis will be to explore the potential benefits of separating the 
infrastructure investment form the rest of the field, and finding potential investors for 
the investment.  
To make it easier to keep track on which alternative investor that has the attention in 
the thesis, each alternative will be explained with one of the symbols shown under.  
    
This chapter shows four different investment alternatives. Three criteria in each 
alternative will be enlightened; the incentives, the risk and the cost of capital. When 
comparing the different alternatives to the same criteria’s there will be some 
similarities in how the investors look them. The first section of this chapter will focus 
on the similarities. Later on there will be a more specific explanation of each 
alternative that will focus on what the investor looks into.  
5.1 WHY INVEST IN INFRASTRUCTURE ON THE NCS? 
This section focuses on the common incentives within the four alternatives that have 
been presented, and why the investors should invest in infrastructure on the NCS. 
5.1.1 COMMON INCENTIVE FOR THE ALTERNATIVE INVESTORS  
According to the investment theory as described in chapter 2, the main incentive for 
an investment is the potential rate of return. Investors would not invest in assets that 
have a negative rate of return and therefore positive rate of return is the motivation 
behind the investment.  
5.1.2 COMMON RISK FOR THE ALTERNATIVE INVESTORS  
The risk of investing in a pipeline on the NCS is mainly divided into two parts. Both 
of them will lead to either lower return on the investment or no return on the 
investment at all.  
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A risk for the investors is if the projected amount of gas produced from the field gets 
too low, or that production never starts. This is unlikely to happen, but if the projected 
amount of recoverable resources decreases to an amount that will be unprofitable for 
companies, the field will be shut down before production starts. The investor will 
have invested the total cost of a pipeline with no possible way to get return on the 
investment.   
Another risky part of the investment is if the production starts with a high prospect for 
the field and the actual production never meets the expectations of the predictions. 
Since the tariffs K element is set in the beginning of production there may not be 
enough resources in the field to get to the point where the investors get their 
reasonable return on the investment. This is also an unlikely scenario, and normally it 
is the opposite way, that more volumes will utilize the infrastructure, hence pay tariff 
to the owners.  
Due to the MPE’s readjustment of the tariff there is a perception that there might be 
risk connected to the change in the stability of the future tariff level. 
5.2 THE BENEFITS AND DISADVANTAGES OF E&P MAJORS 
INVESTING IN GAS INFRASTRUCTURE ON THE NCS 
 The model used on the NCS today is that the E&P companies investi in 
gas infrastructure. This will be the base-case in the analysis later in chapter 6. Section 
5.2 looks at the different factors of why this may be a good alternative for future 
development of oil and gas on the NCS.  
The structure of E&P´s investments are based on a project-to-project basis. E&P 
companies have an interest in producing and transporting their gas as reasonable as 
possible.  
5.2.1 INCENTIVES 
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One of the characteristic incentives for E&P companies is the need for good 
transportation possibilities for the produced gas t in order to realize income. E&P 
companies may be willing to finance a pipeline if it gives a good transportation 
system. The only reason to invest in this transport system is if the resources in a field 
would cover the costs and lost rate of return. 
Another incentive for E&P companies to invest in gas infrastructure is to secure 
transportation capacity. As explained earlier in the thesis, the investors of a pipeline 
have the first right to book capacity in the given pipe when it is operational. And if 
the E&P companies invest in pipelines in future projects it is assumed this privilege is 
continued.  
5.2.2 RISK 
No risk related to E&P specifically  
5.2.3 COST OF CAPITAL 
A challenge for an E&P company when investing in infrastructure is  the rate of 
return on the infrastructure investment is lower than their main activity, exploration 
and production. These investments are categorized as low risk projects compared to 
finding oil and gas, and have a lower rate of return. E&P companies have to have a 
large rate of return on their projects to be able to finance the exploration activity, and 
large investments with relative low return does not fit their portfolio.  
This makes it hard for an E&P company to get funds to invest in projects that have a 
lower rate of return than 15%. Subsequently the cost of investing in gas infrastructure 
is high and it might lower the liquidity of the E&P company, and could result in a 
higher price for capital. 
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5.3 WHY SHOULD E&P MINORS INVEST IN GAS 
INFRASTRUCTURE ON THE NCS? 
 This section will also take a look at the E&P companies, but in this case 
it will be focused on the E&P minors on the NCS. The incentives and the risk of 
mainly the same in both alternatives but the section of how they raise capital and their 
cost of capital are possible a lot higher than the majors.  
5.3.1 COST OF CAPITAL FOR E&P MINORS 
It’s assumed that minor E&P companies normally do not have the opportunity to 
acquire cheap capital at the same level as the major E&P companies.  Since they have 
less production and larger costs connected to the amount of production, they take a 
larger risk. As the risk increases, the higher the cost to acquire capital will be. 
5.4 WHY WOULD THE NORWEGIAN GOVERNMENT INVEST IN GAS 
INFRASTRUCTURE ON THE NCS? 
 This section explores why the Norwegian government should invest in 
infrastructure on the NCS.  The Norwegian government is already a big investor on 
the NCS today, with its ownership Statoil ASA and Petoro AS.  
5.4.1 INCENTIVES 
The oil and gas industry is the one of the most important industries for the Norwegian 
government. To be able to ensure development of the industry the stakeholders has to 
minimize the production cost of oil and gas in the future. One of the reasons the 
Norwegian government should invest in infrastructure on the NCS is that it would 
lower the cost for the E&P companies to develop oil & gas fields. This would enable 
smaller fields that, given the situation today, would normally get classified as non-
profitable to be developed.  
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Another reason of why the government has incentives to invest in infrastructure on 
the NCS is the macro economical perspective for the Norwegian society. A well 
developed oil and gas industry creates jobs and higher GDP for the time to come, and 
will benefit the Norwegian government in the long run.  
5.4.2 COST OF CAPITAL 
According to the investment rules of the Norwegian Pension fund, it is not allowed to 
invest in infrastructure. This thesis looks at possible future solutions and the 
Norwegian pension fund is a very interesting alternative.  
One of the reasons to let the Norwegian pension fund invest in the infrastructure on 
the NCS is that is has access to cheap capital, this make them attractive for the NCS 
since they have an AAA credit rating among several rating companies. (Trading 
Economics) 
5.5 WHY SHOULD INVESTMENT FUNDS INVEST IN GAS 
INFRASTRUCTURE ON THE NCS? 
 This section looks at the alternative for external investment funds on the 
NCS.  The focus will be on Investment funds or large international financial 
institutions that have no other obligation to the NCS than investing in infrastructure.   
5.5.1 INCENTIVES 
One of the advantages for an investment fund to invest in infrastructure on the NCS is 
the possibility of diversifying a portfolio. There is a relatively stable return of 7% 
which has low correlation with the stock market. This investment could be a part of 
the portfolio diversification and lower the overall risk. 
An attractive investment has a good and stable return over a long period of time. 
Infrastructure investments fits this profile and this can attract investment funds to the 
NCS. 
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5.5.2 RISK 
The NCS has been looked upon as a stable and secure place to invest in from a 
political context. This was reduced in 2013 when the MPE lowered the K element in 
the tariff by 90%, after much of the shares were bought by international investment 
companies. This has become an issues some of the companies have raised a lawsuit 
against the Norwegian government. Decisions like this have increased the risk of 
investing in NCS related to gas infrastructure. 
5.5.3 COST OF CAPITAL 
Big international funds have per definition normally access to a reasonable amount of 
capital, and are able to invest in large project over a long period of time. Infrastructure 
investments have been a more and more attractive type of investment over the last ten 
years. Since investment funds have a relatively easy access to large amount of capital, 
they may be able to finance infrastructure on the NCS.  
5.6 CAPACITY CHALLENGES FOR NEW INVESTMENT MODELS 
All companies that produce gas wants to sell their gas in the market to obtain a return 
on the development, and they want to sell it as soon as possible.  
The present booking system for the transport of gas gives the companies that invest in 
gas infrastructure the benefit of booking their needed capacity before other 
companies. This means that other companies that need capacity have to wait until 
there is available capacity in the pipeline before they can book anything.  
If the new investment model allows external investors to finance the gas 
infrastructure, it could be a challenge to choose which company that gets the 
advantage of booking capacity first. Not being able to sell the produced gas to the 
market for a time could be a huge disadvantage for the producer.  
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GRAPH 5, BOOKING SCHEDULE FOR A PIPELINE 
Graph 6 illustrates this by showing an example of a booking schedule which shows 
little available capacity in the beginning.  
The challenge is that new investors don’t share the E&P companies’ need of 
transportation, and could possibly create an undefined situation regarding booking of 
capacity. This thesis acknowledges the challenge, but will not consider this in the 
analysis.  
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6.0 ANALYSIS 
This chapter will analyse the two different cases with regard to investment models for 
gas infrastructure on the NCS. It will also analyse the four investor alternatives that 
have been explained and discussed in chapter 5, and how they are qualified as 
investors for the new investment model. The four alternatives will be implemented in 
the two cases and will be analysed on how large their risk adjusted rate of return is. 
The purpose of this is to evaluate if the new investment model is viable and to get a 
view on which of the alternatives that generate most profit for the NCS. This will help 
assess if the new investment model contribute to realizing new gas resources in the 
NCS. 
The two cases presented below are based on the CAPEX shown in the BSGI report 
(Gassco AS, 2014) 
TABLE 7, CAPEX FROM THE BSGI REPORT 19 
In the BSGI report Gassco AS considers different scenarios for the development of 
the Barents Sea. The different volume scenarios have an impact on the result. As an 
                                                 
19
 (Gassco AS, 2014) 
Drilling (low energy reservoirs)
Drilling (high energy reservoirs)
Subsea production system
Subsea compression
Power cable
Onshore pre-compression
Pipelines
Export pipeline 42’’
Export pipeline 32’’
Umbilicals
LNG facility
LNG brownfield at Melkøya
LNG lifetime extension at Melkøya
Processing node offshore
Processing node onshore
Export compression
564
780
540
450
14 740
1 800
Gassco’s cost estimate model
24 000
17 400
12 120
60 000
Input from Snøhvit license
Input from Snøhvit license
24 570
22 540
5 430
MNOK/well
MNOK/well
MNOK/well
MNOK per MSm³/d
NOK/meter cable
MNOK per 20 MSm³/d capacity
MNOK
MNOK
NOK/meter
MNOK for 5 Mtpa train
MNOK per 20 MSm³/d facility
MNOK per 20 MSm³/d facility
MNOK per 20 MSm³/d facility
Cost component Cost Unit
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assumption for the two scenarios the volume of the discovery will be set to 400 
GSm
3
.  
6.1 THE ANALYTICAL METHOD 
This chapter will present two different scenarios, the present investment model and 
the new investment model. The present investment model assumes that E&P 
companies finance the gas infrastructure, whereas the new investment model assumes 
external investors that finance the gas infrastructure. It will be important to look at 
how it can be economic beneficial for the investors as well as for the E&P companies. 
6.1.1 CASE DESCRIPTION OF GAS INFRASTRUCTURE 
Volume 400 GSm
3 
Gas infrastructure CAPEX 80  BNOK 
Rate of return on CAPEX
20
 7% 
Time horizon 2014-2045 
Loan reimbursement (Loan/Equity) 6 yrs, (term loan) 
Rate Loan/Equity for investor
21
 50% 
Interest rate, loan/equity)
22
  5% 
Norwegian tax rules, offshore/onshore 51%,27% and uplift deprecation 22% 
Inflation rate 2% 
TABLE 8, FINANCIAL INFORMATION FOR THE BASE CASE23 
In the BSGI report there are several costs that are estimated for the different 
transportation alternatives in relation to the future Barents Sea development. This 
thesis does not base its scenario in the Barents Sea development, but the figures in the 
report will be used as an example to show the effect of separating the cost for 
development of the field and the infrastructure.  
Table 7 shows the cost of investing in infrastructure from the Barents Sea to the 
Norwegian Sea, and estimates it to be 80 BNOK. This includes a pipeline with a 
                                                 
20
 According to the standard tariff regulations. (Solveig Gas Norway) 
21
 Base case, will be set to 50% as long as nothing else is mentioned 
22
 Base case, will be set to 5% as long as nothing else is mentioned 
23
 (Gassco AS, 2014) 
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diameter of 42”, a processing node onshore and export compression. This will be the 
gas infrastructure CAPEX of the following analysis.  
The CAPEX and volumes are set in the case, but for the potential investors that would 
be interested in investing in infrastructure there could be a difference in the 
discounting rate of the investment. In the following section there will be an analysis 
of how much each investor would have to pay for the investment.  Every investor has 
to pay the same CAPEX, but each investor has its own WACC and risk adjusted NPV 
which implies an impact on the rate of return. In this case the CAPEX is set and 
therefore the next section will determine the difference between each investor is able 
to finance the investment. This will be done to determine what purpose the investment 
models have for the development of the infrastructure on the NCS.  
6.2 WHAT IS THE COST OF BUILDING THE BASE CASE GAS 
INFRASTRUCTURE? 
This section will estimate the return of the development of the gas infrastructure. The 
total return on the project will have to be higher than the investors risk adjusted rate 
of return to show interest in the project. The numbers of this project will be found and 
in the appendix, but the context of the analysis will be explained along with the 
graphs and tables in this section. 
Graph 7, shows the cash flow of the gas infrastructure project. It does not consider the 
field development or any other costs than the CAPEX investment. The graph shows 
the startup of the investment from 2014 until the CAPEX is finished funded in 2018. 
After this the production and revenue starts. The estimated field size of 400 GSm
3
 is 
estimated to end production by the year 2045. This gives a yearly cash flow rate after 
tax displayed by the black line in the graph. The total IRR for this project is estimated 
to be 5,49% which gives a reasonable return depending on the investor. The grey field 
shows the cumulative cash flow over time and gives total revenue of 28 BNOK14 
after tax. The scenario is given with the assumption in the base case where the interest 
rate for the loan is 5% and a payback period of a 6 year, financed by 50% equity and 
50% loan. (Appendix1 &4) 
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GRAPH 6, CASH FLOW FOR PIPELINE CAPEX, BASE CASE, IRR IN %  (APPEDIX 1&4) 
The revenue of Graph 6 is based on the calculation of the K element from the tariff 
formula. This gives a return on the investment of 7% percent before tax. However, 
due to taxes and capital cost the final IRR of the investment ends at 5,49% post tax.    
Graph 6 gives a visual impression of the fixed income, assumed the gas infrastructure 
gets into Gassled JV’s portfolio. This gives a steady income of 7% of the CAPEX. 
6.2.1 THE INVESTORS POINT OF VIEW IF THE INVESTMENT 
In the previous section Graph 6 showed the investments cost and revenue. This 
section will give an overview of how the investor looks at the investment and which 
potential they have to make a profit of the investment. Investors will discount the 
investment to see how it will fit their portfolio, and then see if the investment is as 
valuable as expected. This is measured by the discounted NPV for each investor. 
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GRAPH 7, PROJECT VALUE VS. DISCOUNTING RATE (APPENDIX 1 & 4) 
Graph 7 shows the NPV of the potential investors. This graph illustrates the 
differences between the different investors. Graph 6 is based on the base case which 
gives an IRR of 5,49%, and investors that has a higher expected rate of return than 
5,49% sees no value in investing in this gas infrastructure, if the revenue is fixed at 
7% before tax.  
Two alternatives that could be satisfied with the investment are the “Governmental 
funding” and the “Investment funds”. They have a lower expected rate of return and 
would potentially profit on the investment. However, looking at Graph 7 we also see 
that the two E&P alternatives are below the breakeven point of 5,49%, with the E&P 
majors that needs a 15% expected return, and the E&P minors that needs a 10% 
expected return to break even. 
The graphs above only illustrates the gas infrastructure investment, and do not 
consider the whole project economy combined with an additional field investment. 
Section 6.3 will give an example of how the project economy would look like if both 
gas infrastructure and field infrastructure would be financed in the same project and 
by the same investor.  
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6.3 THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN PRESENT AND FUTURE 
INVESTMENT MODEL 
To show an example of how a potential infrastructure project could be financed, it is 
necessary to look at the field development cost. This includes investment for rigs, 
subsea installations and pipelines. The numbers from the base case is the foundation 
of the gas infrastructure investment. Assumptions have been made to the gas price  be 
able to calculate the effect of separating the pipeline investment. 
Volume 400 GSm
3 
Gas transport infrastructure CAPEX  80 BNOK14 
Rate of return on CAPEX
24
 7% 
Time horizon 2014-2045 
Loan reimbursement (Loan/Equity) 6 yrs, (term loan) 
Rate Loan/Equity for investor
25
 50% 
Interest rate, loan/equity)
26
  5% 
Norwegian tax rules, offshore/onshore 51%,27% and uplift deprecation 22% 
Inflation rate 2% 
Field development (Field A) 30 BNOK14 
Field development (Field B) 30 BNOK14 
Total CAPEX for development 140 BNOK14 
Gas price 2,2 NOK14/Sm
3 
TABLE 9, FIELD ASSUMPTIONS AND PIPELINE DEVELOPMENT COST27 
The purpose of this model is to explore the potential value of letting external investor 
finance the gas infrastructure instead of the present model, where E&P companies 
finance both field and gas infrastructure. Since the gas infrastructure could turn out to 
be beneficial for two of the investors the new investment model has a potential to be 
beneficial for both investors and E&P companies.  
                                                 
24
 According to the standard tariff regulations. (Solveig Gas Norway) 
25
 Base case, will be set to 50% as long as nothing else is mentioned 
26
 Base case, will be set to 5% as long as nothing else is mentioned 
27
 (Gassco AS, 2014) 
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If an external investor agrees to finance the gas infrastructure with a rate of return of 
7%, the E&P companies that depend on the transportation then finance the CAPEX 
through the tariff instead of an upfront investment. This section shows both models, 
each of them will be analyzed to find the benefits or disadvantages of the models. The 
first one is the present model where E&P companies finance the entire project. 
6.3.1 PROJECT FINANCING BY E&P COMPANIES 
 
GRAPH 8, E&P COMPANIES FINANCE BOTH FIELD AND PIPELINE (APPENDIX 1 & 3) 
Graph 8 shows the cash flow when an E&P company finances the entire project. The 
tariff revenues are not shown in the graph, because the tariff would be paid to the 
investors and will not be relevant for this example. The income of the field then 
relates to the net revenue of the gas sale from the gas field. The income in both 
scenarios will be the same, and it will be possible to compare them with each other.   
The important numbers to notice in Graph 8 is the IRR, the top of the cumulative cash 
flow after tax and the bottom line of the cumulative cash flow after tax. The reason 
these are important is to be able to analyze the overall rate of return on the 
investment. The IRR in Graph 8 is calculated to 9,18%, and the total revenue of the 
investment in year 2046 is calculated to be 94 BNOK after tax. The bottom line of the 
cumulative cash flow shows an exposure of 95 BNOK14 in 2018.  
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If we add the discounted NPV for the different investors to the graph, we see how the 
levels adjust compared to Graph 7 for the gas infrastructure.   
 
 
GRAPH 9, RPOJECT VALUE VS. DISCOUNTING RATE (APPENDIX 1 & 3) 
Graph 9 shows the different levels of discounted NPV each company wants to achieve 
for the project. The difference in the IRR makes a large difference compared to the 
gas infrastructure project shown in Graph 7. With a IRR of 9,18%, the E&P 
companies are closer to make a profit on the investment than with only the pipeline 
project. On the next page same project will be analyzed, however with an external 
investor financing the pipeline and the E&P companies taking the rest of the field 
investment. 
 
 
 
 
54 
 
6.3.2 SEPARATED FINANCING OF THE PIPELINE INFRASTRUCTURE 
 
GRAPH 10, CASH FLOW FOR SEPARATED PROJECT (APPENDIX 1 & 2) 
Graph 10 looks similar to graph 8, but has a smaller capital exposure in the 
investment period and a smaller cumulative cash flow after tax in year 2046. Since an 
external investor has financed the pipeline the total CAPEX is lower in this scenario. 
Since the transporter has to pay tariff to the investor, the invested capital has been 
distributed amongst the production years. For every Sm
3
 with gas the producer send, 
part of the transportation cost goes to pay the CAPEX and the return of the gas 
infrastructure.  
This gives a new IRR for this project. As seen in Graph 10 the IRR has risen to 
13,66% for the entire project, this gives a difference of 4,48% in the IRR  between the 
two different investment models. The cumulative cash flow gives a return of 66 
BNOK14, which is lower than the model that is fully financed by E&P companies. 
The differences between the two revenues are:   
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The summation above shows the difference of 28 BNOK14, which is the same as the 
return on the separated pipeline investment. Even though the result of the cumulative 
cash flow is lower, the IRR rate makes the invested capital more profitable for the 
investor of the gas field than it would be if they financed both. 
To show how the alternative investors come out on this model, the graph shows the 
discounted NPV for the different alternatives. 
 
GRAPH 11, DISCOUNTED PROJECT VALUE (APPENDIX 1 & 2 
As a result of the separation of infrastructure the IRR for the project will increase and 
there will be a small gap from the breakeven point, to the point of 15% discounted 
rate where E&P companies are. This indicates that it would be favorable for an E&P 
company to encourage the model where the infrastructure is separated from the field 
6.4 INTERPRETATION OF THE ANALYSIS 
In the previous section the difference between the present and the separate investment 
model were analysed but what does it actually mean? This section will interpret the 
figures and show the benefits and possible disadvantages of the separated investment 
model. The separated model shows that the IRR of the investment is larger than the 
56 
 
IRR of the present model, and the result shows a difference of 4,48%, from 9,18% to 
13,66%. This shows that the separated model has a higher return on the invested 
capital and would make a better investment for the E&P companies. Since the 
pipeline has proven its potential in the analysis as the separate investment for two of 
the investors, it supports the realization of separate investment model. Comparing the 
two discounted graphs, Graph 9 and Graph 11, shows the different level of exposure 
for both scenarios. In Graph 9 the exposure is 95 BNOK14 in 2018 as its maximum, 
and Graph 11 shows an exposure of 37 BNOK14 in 2018 as its maximum. The same 
amount of capital is invested in both of the scenarios, but the time of investment is 
different for E&P. In the separated investment model the revenue for E&P companies 
is lower for each year since they pay tariff for transportation of the gas. This 
transportation cost pays for the gas infrastructure as well for the 7% return that the 
investor of the gas infrastructure is entitled. And the rate of return of 28 BNOK14 is 
the difference between the two models in the cumulative cash flow after tax at the end 
of production. It shows that the two different investment models have the same 
revenue from the development, and in 2046 the difference between the two models 
shows the same as the rate of return of the gas infrastructure investment.  
The separate investment model allows E&P companies to free some of their capital 
and give them the opportunity to invest in several projects at the same time with a 
higher rate of return on the project. If E&P companies have to realize the project with 
the financial structure of the present model the exposure will be too high and the rate 
of return is too low with a field size of 400 GSm
3
. The field has to generate higher 
profit for the E&P companies to invest in the project, since the cost of infrastructure is 
so high. 
As shown in the analysis the gas infrastructure investment gives an acceptable rate of 
return for two of the investors, and the new investment model gives a better return for 
the E&P companies. This shows that it is beneficial for both new investors and E&P 
companies to encourage the separated model. 
In a socio-economic point of view it could be beneficial to use the separated 
investment model for future developments where the infrastructure cost is high. If 
field reserve levels stay at the given level in the scenario, the profit of the field is too 
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low to cover for the infrastructure investment. It shows that the separation of the 
investment model could lower the exposure level and raise the rate of return of the 
project, which means that the project is more likely to be built even if the resource 
levels stay at the given level.  
According to the analysis the most important incentive for the investors are met in 
two of the alternatives, which are; the Investment Funds and the Norwegian 
Government. For these two potential investors the investment is profitable since they 
have a lower expected rate of return then the other investors, they are able to acquire 
cheap capital and are satisfied with a lower rate of return as long as it is stable and 
predictable. 
The new investment model shows a potential profit for both E&P companies and for 
the new potential investors. A challenge with the new investment model is the 
potential of over dimensioning the gas infrastructure to make higher profit for the 
investors. This could lower the economic barrier for field and gas infrastructure 
investments. Furthermore it could lead to development of small fields that not 
necessarily are economic profitable, to become profitable fields. Or, this could lead to 
development of unstable fields, which might end up being too small to generate profit. 
These are some of the potential challenges that have to be solved before a new 
investment model takes place. Before any investment process is started, the process 
has to be clarified between E&P companies and the potential investors.  
As an investor the Norwegian Government has the opportunity to benefit from the 
investment in two ways, the profit directly from the investment and gain 
socioeconomic profit. If the infrastructure is built it can encourage E&P companies to 
discover and develop more fields around the infrastructure and create higher activity 
and a longer production on the NCS. The benefits from the new investment model, 
either it’s the Norwegian Government or an Investment fund, it would give the E&P 
companies a higher IRR on their field development. It could also generate profit for 
the Norwegian Government who would benefit from the new realization of gas 
resources. 
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To make Norway a more competitive actor in the international gas marked its 
important to maintain a low CAPEX. If the CAPEX increase it will make the 
production of gas from Norway more expensive and make it less competitive against 
other markets. The new model shows that getting a higher IRR can be achievable by 
letting external investors invest. With the present model the market situation would be 
harder, and could lower the expectations of new field developments on the NCS. This 
could imply that the E&P companies would then have to sell the gas at a higher price 
to be able to have the same IRR on the projects.   
 
7.0 CONCLUSION 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to explore if new investment models for infrastructure on 
the NCS have any effect on the realization of new gas resources. The problem 
formulation answered in this thesis is:  
“What purpose has new investment models for infrastructure for realization of new 
gas resources on the NCS?”   
The analysis shows that the new investment model for infrastructure could help 
realizing new gas resources on the NCS by letting external investors invest in large 
infrastructure projects. It shows that investment funds with a solid liquidity and the 
Norwegian Government are suitable investors for new infrastructure. Filed 
developments with large gas infrastructure investments financed by E&P companies, 
is not seen as the best alternative according to the analysis. This gives a lower IRR for 
the whole project. 
All internal projects in E&P companies have to compete for the access to capital, and 
the soundest projects with the highest expected return are financed. Infrastructure 
investments on the NCS do not achieve the same expected return because of the 
regulation on the rate of return. When the cost of infrastructure is combined with the 
field development investment, the low return on the infrastructure could prevent the 
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whole field to be developed. The field’s rate of return has to be substantially higher 
than 15% to be able to make up for low return on the infrastructure.  
The socio-economic benefits of enabling external investors to invest in gas 
infrastructure on the NCS are the opportunity this gives to the realization of new gas 
resources. This encourages field development and could enable smaller fields to be 
economic profitable, since the transportation solution is present.  
7.1  UNCERTAINTIES 
The analysis is based on the numbers from the BSGI report. These numbers are 
gathered by a working group facilitated by Gassco AS, where many E&P companies 
that operate in the NCS participate. The numbers in this report are as accurate as 
possible, but are still just estimates of the real project cost. 
To be able to make the base case of the infrastructure investment, the investment cost 
in the analysis is calculated on the background of investment history from the four 
different investment alternatives. Their real investment cost may vary from the 
example, however, this does not have a severely affect on the main conclusion of the 
thesis. 
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APPENDIX 1, General assumptions 
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APPENDIX 2, New model (Cum. NPV, Input Data for Graph 11 &12, Sensitivities) 
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APPENDIX 3, Present model, (Cum. NPV, Input Data for Graph 9 & 10, 
Sensitivities) 
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APPENDIX 4 
The gas infrastructure only (Cum. NPV, Input Data for Graph 7 & 8, Sensitivities) 
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